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Chinese-Iranian Mutual
Strategic Perceptions
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Niv Horesh, and Ruike Xu*
A B S T R A C T
This article analyzes Sino-Iranian relations andmutual strategic perceptions, highlighting sev-
eral types of tension in Sino-Iranian ties alongside areas of deeper cooperation. We examine
in particular the policy debates about China between conservatives and reformists within Iran,
and we compare their views of China to the views of Iran held by Chinese commentators.
To that end, we extensively survey both the ofﬁcial media and scholarly literature in Farsi
and in Chinese, since each strand reveals different sentiments and is accorded a different de-
gree of openness.
A relatively little-studied debate is under way in the Islamic Republic of Iranbetween the two main factions of the political elite, conveniently divided into
camps of conservatives and reformists, over Iran’s relations with the great powers.
In these strategic debates, and for different reasons, relations with the People’s Re-
public of China, on the one hand, and theUnited States, on the other, have loomed
large. The outcome of these debates will likely have profound implications for
Iran’s place in the emerging post-bipolar international order and for how Tehran
will project itself regionally and internationally.
With this in mind, this article analyzes Sino-Iranian relations, drawing on a
large array of primary sources in both Farsi and Chinese.We will highlight several
tiers of tension in Sino-Iranian ties alongside areas of cooperation. In the conclu-
sion, wewill draw on our analysis of Chinese and Iranian perceptions, in particular
on policy debates between conservatives and reformists within Iran, in a bid to
assess how Sino-Iranian relations might fare in the future.
To that end, we have undertaken an extensive survey of the Farsi-language me-
dia, teasing out the sentiments and rationales guiding reformist and conservative
policy makers in Tehran. The recurrent themes in the Iranian discourse will be
cross-referenced with the discourse about Iran inside China, in order to weigh
up the validity of optimistic as well as ambivalent strands regarding China’s and
Iran’s current and prospective relations.
* Corresponding author: Ruike Xu.
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In doing so, we will provide a far more textured and nuanced analysis of Chi-
nese agency in the Middle East and of Sino-Iranian relations in particular.1 Our
approach is framed by a set of critical questions: Might China seek a bolder ap-
proach in the Middle East and move beyond deference to American sensitivities
in its approach to Iran? Might China’s energy-driven interests in Iran become
broader and more strategic, and include a substantive military treaty?2
CHINA FROM IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES: OPPORTUNISTIC
ECONOMIC PARTNER OR STRATEGIC ALLY?
In the Iranian power structure, political parties do not operate in the same way as
in Western parliamentary democracies. Instead, there are camps or alignments
each of which consists of several political groups. Broadly speaking, the political
factions can be divided into two major groups, the conservatives (Osulgrayan)
and the moderates and reformists (Eslahtalaban), and there is an obvious distinc-
tion between their preferences in terms of foreign policy. By analyzing op-ed ar-
ticles published in several newspapers linked to the conservative and reformist
camps, this section will show how these camps perceive China.
In general, several recurrent themes can be discerned in this Iranian discourse
on China, which we will reevaluate later based on Chinese sources. These primar-
ily relate to the degree to which China’s approach to Iran can be deemed as
grounded in “civilizational” solidarity (as seen through largely conservative eyes),
or in a purely realistic and opportunistic logic (depicted in most reformist com-
mentaries). The two wings of Iranian politics are at variance over whether, based
on China’s patchy record of compliance with Western sanctions on Iran, China
can be considered a reliable ally that would come to Tehran’s rescue if the latter
were militarily attacked by the United States. Correspondingly, there are differ-
ences between reformists and conservatives over whether Tehran should deepen
economic cooperation with China or look instead to European competitors so
as to hedge against economic overreliance on Beijing. In addition, a proxy debate
is under way about the extent to which China’s traditions and worldview can be
deemed “Islam-friendly,” as argued by Iranian conservatives, or not, as alleged by
reformists.
1. The most important studies to date of China and the Middle East are Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle
East in China’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Hashim S. H. Behbehani,
China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–1975 (London: Kegan Paul, 1981); Lillian Craig Harris,
China Considers the Middle East (London: Tauris, 1993); P. R. Kumaraswamy, China and the Middle East
(London: Sage, 1999); Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States
and the Middle East (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008). The most authoritative study of Sino-Iranian relations
is John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2006).
2. Manochehr Dorraj and Carrie L. Currier, “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing
World,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 2 (2008 ): 66–80.
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The general view in Iranian reformist newspapers is that China has been pur-
suing a largely peaceful development strategy in recent decade. This has led to
growing Chinese geopolitical clout around the world. Although Chinese leaders
have consistently declared that they are not interested in Asian hegemony in order
to skirt global tensions, it is obvious that China not only has become a regional
hegemon but also an international power. Two reasons have been outlined for
China’s success. China is cast by the Iranian press as “the factory of the world”
as a result of which the European andAmericanmarkets have been saturated with
Chinese products; and the other mainstay of China’s economic hegemony is its
heavy investments in infrastructure projects on other continents.3 Despite the re-
luctance of China to weigh into Middle Eastern problems, its economic growth
has almost involuntarily thrust Beijing into the region and has challenged China’s
earlier efforts to portray itself as having a relatively noninterventionist approach.4
According to Iranian reformists, although China views Iran as a powerful po-
litical and strategic actor in the heart of theMiddle East, its peaceful development
policy means that China does not see any country—including Russia—as a stra-
tegic partner in the international system. Therefore China, as a realist actor, pur-
sues two main objectives regarding Iran. First, to Chinese leaders, Iran’s energy
reserves are important for China’s economic development. Second, Iran will be
geographically important for maintaining the free ﬂow of oil and natural gas in
the future.5
Due to the presence of Americanwarships in the Strait of Malacca and concerns
of a possible future conﬂict between China and the United States in the Paciﬁc,
Beijing is looking for a new way to secure its energy needs. By building a pipeline
to bring natural gas from Iran to Pakistan and also developing an Iran-Turkmenistan
pipeline, China aims to permanently secure its energy resources. Third, Iranians
suspect that the development of defense cooperation between Iran and China is
not based on a long-term strategic view in Beijing but rather may end up as a mere
bargaining chip in China’s political arsenal vis-à-vis the United States, particularly
as regards Washington’s continuing protection of Taiwan.6
China’s President Xi Jinping is thought to be eager to develop diplomatic rela-
tions with both Shi’a Iran and Sunni rival Saudi Arabia because both countries are
the main suppliers of energy for Beijing. Insofar as China cautiously condemns
Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and China’s policy toward Syria is closer
to Iran’s, reformists concede China leans toward the Islamic Republic. However,
3. Hussein Rahdari, “The Chinese Way of Hegemony” [in Farsi], Donya-e-Eqtesad, January 31, 2016.
4. Sara Ma’asoumi, Chinese Anti-Corruption in Tehran” [in Farsi], Etemaad Daily, January 23, 2016;
also Badamchi Shabestari, “The New Chapter in Tehran-Beijing Relations” [in Farsi], Iran, January 25, 2016.
5. Baharat Mohebi, “Revolution in Washington’s Foreign Policy” [in Farsi], Shargh Daily, August 27,
2015; also Hussein Malaek, “Speculations Regarding Strategic Relations with China” [in Farsi], Vaghaye
Daily, January 24, 2016.
6. Malaek, “Speculations.”
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Beijing talks to representatives from both the Syrian government and the oppo-
sition and promises to play a more active role in a prospective peace process in
Syria. In order to build constructive relations with Arab counties as well as with
Iran, Xi Jinping has pledged support for Palestinian statehood and also has allo-
cated aid for the reconstruction of Gaza. For Iranian reformists, what is evident in
all of this is that China would do its utmost to avoid taking sides in the region,
wishing to see a reduction in the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.7
Furthermore, the role of China in Iran since the beginning of the nuclear sanc-
tions imposed by the West has often provoked among reformists an emotive
negative reaction toward Beijing. They argue that China’s auxiliary sanctions-
enforcement role is consistent with its realist (some say opportunistic) approach.
While China remained a key trading partner for Iran throughout the period of US-
led economic sanctions, Chinese leaders had agreed to back crucial aspects of the
sanctions against Iran frombehind the scenes. This is described as a “double game”
to China’s advantage, enabling it to proﬁtably invest in Iran and for Chinese prod-
ucts to ﬂood the Iranian market. That is why Xi Jinping is perceived as having
hastened to visit Tehran in January 2016, so soon after the signing of the Vienna
nuclear deal between the West and Iran: to safeguard the dominance of Chinese
ﬁrms ahead of the reentry of Western corporations.8
The reformists suggested that after economic sanctions are fully lifted Tehran
would not have to offer Chinese ﬁrms preferential terms, as EU investors will be
equally keen to do business in Iran: “the Chinese government [will then have to]
offer attractive commercial packages to its Iranian partners.”9
By contrast, Iranian conservatives portray China as a natural strategic partner
of the Islamic Republic. For example, the conservative president of the Iran-China
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Asadollah Asgaroladi, argues that Tehran
should view Beijing as a long-term ally considering the troubled historical relations
between Iran and Western powers. In the wake of the nuclear deal and the pos-
sibility of Western investment, Iran should not simply sidetrack ties with China,
because historical evidence suggests that theWest would aim again to isolate Iran.
In other words, the West is perceived by conservatives as an inherently unreliable
partner, while reformists yearn for greaterWestern investment in the Iranian econ-
omy, not least so as to lessen reliance on China.10
For the conservatives, therefore, the relationship with China has always been
fair and equal. Future investments by China in Iran would be a win-win game for
7. Ma’asoumi, “Chinese Anti-Corruption in Tehran.”
8. “Zanganeh Negotiates in Beijing” [in Farsi], Etemaad Daily, April 9, 2015.
9. Ali A. Zebardast, “The Advantage of Iran in Trading with China” [in Farsi], Farhikhtegan Daily,
January 24, 2016.
10. Asadollah Asgaroladi, “Iran and China on the Path of Joint Investment” [in Farsi], Jam-e-Jam Daily,
January 24, 2016.
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both parties.11 The Iranian ambassador to China during the Ahmadinejad pres-
idential tenure (2005–13) argues that since “no one should put all eggs in one
basket,” Iran should not neglect its old ally China just because of the potential
for Iran-West rapprochement after the nuclear agreement.12
THE DEBATE OVER CHINA ’S ECONOMIC RECORD IN IRAN
Increasingly, China ﬁnds itself at the forefront of debates in Iran about the coun-
try’s economic future. The main controversy can be traced back to December 2007,
during archconservative Mahmoud Ahmadinajad’s tenure as president of the
Islamic Republic. In July 2006 the United Nations imposed sanctions in response
to Iran’s ongoing nuclear program, and by December 2007 most European petro-
leum companies (such as France’s Total) had withdrawn from Iran. The China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) thus became the primary foreign con-
tractor working with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop Ira-
nian gas and oil ﬁelds. Due to the absence of competition from other global leading
oil corporations, the CNPC all but monopolized the Iranian oil and gas industry
for several years, with Ahmadinajad’s blessing.
However, CNPC leeway in Iran considerably narrowed down as soon as re-
formist Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidential mantle in August 2013. Citing
CNPCdelays in delivering on its infrastructural investment promises, the Rouhani
administration terminated the agreement between the CNPC and the NIOC re-
garding the development of gas and oil ﬁelds in Pars-e Jenoubi and Azadegan in
2013 and 2014, respectively.13 Some reformists argued that the delay of CNPC
investment in Pars-e Jenoubi was because of the Chinese ﬁrm’s inexperience in
the Iranian oil industry and the insufﬁciency of its technology compared with that
of Western multinational corporations. In addition the CNPC is said to have bro-
ken its promises in the development of other oil ﬁelds.14 It is estimated that the
CNPC’s noncompliance led to a ﬁnancial loss of over $11 billion for Iran.15 The
pushback against such a high-proﬁle Chinese company by Iran is signiﬁcant given
the strategic context of the relationship with China.
By comparing a similar agreement between the Iraqi government and the
CNPC, reformist-inclined energy analyst Said Ghulamhussein Hassantash argues
that the contract noncompliance of the Chinese company was directly related to
11. Ali-Reza Managhebi, “The Win-Win Trade with China” [in Farsi], Jam-e-Jam Daily, January 25,
2016.
12. Javad Mansouri, “Iran and China in the Post Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” [in Farsi], Jam-e-
Jam Daily, January 23, 2016.
13. “The Chinese Oil Giant Was Expelled from Iran” [in Farsi], Meher News Agency, April 24, 2014.
14. S. Saidi, “The Enigma of the Chinese in Pars-e Jenoubi” [in Farsi], Arman, August 7, 2012.
15. Ibid.
Chinese-Iranian Mutual Strategic Perceptions • 5
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.105 on March 27, 2018 07:37:38 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
the international sanctions in place at the time.16 The CNPC’s agreement with the
Iraqi government met the deadline while China deliberately slowed down its prog-
ress in the exploration of Iranian gas and oil ﬁelds. Hassantash notes that this is
because China faced a dilemma regarding Iran. He observes that over 50 percent
of China’s foreign investment in energy has been in North America and that be-
cause of the US sanctions China has been forced to choose between Iran and
America. Hence, although China became the only international actor in Iran’s en-
ergy sector during the sanctions, its hefty investments in the West inevitably re-
stricted its activities in Iran.17 The implication of Hassantash observations is that
China would never pursue a pact with Iran in deﬁance of theUnited States because
much more is at stake for China in terms of accessing developed economies as
compared with access to the Iranian economy.
Consistent with this argument, other reformists severely censured the “Sini-
cization” of the Iranian economy and especially the energy industry. Overreliance
on Chinese investment is thought to have reduced the bargaining power of Iran
because of the absence of Western competition. Beijing in these circumstances
could dictate “the rules of the game.”18 In contrast to the portrayal of China as a
strategic partner by the conservatives, the reformists asserted that in the postsanc-
tions era, the reformist administration of Hassan Rouhani must reduce the pres-
ence of China in the Iranian oil and gas sectors.19
Although in the last year of Ahmadinejad’s tenure, the Iranian oil minister,
Rostam Ghasemi, threatened to dislodge the CNPC from Pars-e Jenoubi, the re-
formist commentator Narges Rasouli argued that the oil minister’s threat should
not be taken seriously, given the “special relationship” between Iranian conser-
vatives and China.20 Ultimately, the victory of the reformists in the presidential
election of 2013 resulted in the termination of a “bad contract” with the CNPC.
The Chinese company was also accused of handing over sensitive information
about the oil ﬁeld in Pars-e Jenoubi, which is jointly operated, to the Iraqi govern-
ment.21 Not surprisingly, following the lifting of the sanctions, Rouhani’s admin-
istration strenuously endeavored to lureWestern oil corporations back to invest in
the oil and gas industry.
Faced with the acute criticism of the reformists, the conservatives implicitly
confessed that the Chinese government had broken its promises. However, they
argued that the Chinese side’s violation of the agreement is due to their lack of
16. Saed Ghulam Hussein Hassantash, “China’s Need for Energy and the Security of the Persian Gulf ”
[in Farsi], Etemad Daily, January 11, 2014.
17. Ibid.
18. Reza Zandi, “The Seventh Night in Oil” [in Farsi], Shargh Daily, September 3, 2011.
19. Narges Rasouli, “The Seven-Year Presence of the Yellow Dragons in Asalouyeh” [in Farsi], Etemad
Daily, May 1, 2014.
20. Ibid.
21. Etemad Daily, August 5, 2014; also Donye-e Eghtesad Daily, August 5, 2014.
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experience, not to their exploiting of Western sanctions. A conservative analyst
suggested that in the last several years Chinese energy companies “have enhanced
their technological capacity and ﬁnancial power” by trial and error, to the extent
that they can compete with transnational oil corporations. Hence, for the conser-
vatives, the presence of China in Iran’s energy sector is important; the realization
of such agreements with Chinese corporations will require considerable patience
and understanding by their Iranian counterparts.22
THE IRANIAN DEBATE OVER THE IMPACT
OF CHINESE CONSUMER GOOD IMPORTS
Iranianmerchants and business leaders generally mock Chinese products as of in-
ferior quality and Iranian popular perceptions of goods labeled “Made in China”
are similarly negative.23 Yet in the early 2010s, the Iranian market became satu-
rated with Chinese products. During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, nearly $40 bil-
lion of Chinese goods, frommotor vehicles to traditional Iranian handicrafts, were
imported to Iran,24 and this trend has continued during Rouhani’s presidency.25
The conservatives generally try to defend the quality of Chinese products and
the trade between the two nations. For example, the economist Ali Sarzaeem notes
that the quality of imported products is not decided by Chinese producers but by
Iranianmerchants. As China exports many high-end products to theUnited States
and to European markets, tarring all Chinese goods with the same brush is un-
justiﬁable.26 Actually, according to Sarzaeem, the Iranian embassy in Beijing re-
quested that the Chinese government verify the quality of exported goods based
on the standardization administration of the People’s Republic of China. Sarzaeem
alleges that smugglers have been trafﬁcking in low-quality Chinese products from
third-party sources such as Dubai.27
Some conservatives, however, agree that the abundance of Chinese goods in
Iran does diminish the policy of economic self-reliance originally aimed at offset-
ting Western sanctions and that most of the low-end consumer products could
have been produced locally. Indeed, they admit that this has led to bankruptcy
22. Zeba Esmaili, “The Long Shadow of China in the Iranian Oil Industry” [in Farsi], Jam-e Jam Daily,
June 10, 2012.
23. Mohammed Hussein Aliakbari, “China, the Leading Producer of Denaturant Goods” [in Farsi],
Jam-e-Jam Daily, January 19, 2016.
24. Ibid.
25. Mohammed Hussein Aliakbari, “The Damage Chinese Products Do to the Policy of Resistant Econ-
omy” [in Farsi], Jam-e-Jam Daily, January 2, 2016.
26. Ali Sarzaeem, “We and the Quality of Chinese Products” [in Farsi], Jahan-e-Sanat Daily, Septem-
ber 16, 2016.
27. Ibid.
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for numerous domestic factories in the clothing and home-appliance sectors, as
well as increasing youth unemployment in the country.28
Although the reformists agree that some Iranian merchants did play a nega-
tive role in importing Chinese low-quality products, they focus their criticisms
on Chinese producers, particularly in the Iranian car market.29 It was estimated
that China would have increased its share from 1 percent in 2011 to around 9 per-
cent in 2016 by exporting 1.17 million cars to Iran annually.30 This dramatic in-
crease forced some to conclude that “if the trend of importing Chinese cars con-
tinues at the same rate in the future, the entire Iranian car market will be conquered
by low-quality cheap Chinese products.”31 Worse still, they pointed out that almost
all Chinese cars exported to developing countries, including Iran, have a “desirable
appearance,” yet their “quality and safety” is extremely low.32 Some even attribute
Iran’s horriﬁc trafﬁc accident casualties (18,000 deaths and 310,000 injuries annu-
ally) to the abundance of low-quality Chinese cars.33
From the standpoint of reformists, the lifting of sanctions presents a valuable
opportunity for Tehran to hedge against economic overreliance on China. How-
ever, even the reformists agree that Iran can beneﬁt from advanced Chinese tech-
nology, speciﬁcally in such technical ﬁelds as electronics and hybrid cars.34
MUSLIMS UNITED OR NOT? UNREST IN XINJIANG
IN THE IRANIAN DISCOURSE
Some of the strongest disagreements regarding China between different factions
in Iran’s political structure date back to the Xinjiang disturbances in 2009. At that
time, the tension between reformists and conservatives was at a high level follow-
ing the outcome of Iran’s tenth presidential election. The conservatives cautiously
criticized China’s long-term policy toward ethnic Uyghurs in its Xinjiang prov-
ince, but they emphasized that the root of the problems there was not simply re-
ligious but a complex combination of “history, ethnicity, and religion aggravated
by poverty, unemployment, social breakdown, political chaos, and more impor-
tantly, US interference.”35 They averred that the ultimate goal of the Uyghurs’
28. G. Farahani, “The Unemployment of Iranians Due to China’s Low-Quality Goods” [in Farsi], Borhan
News, March 2, 2011.
29. “The Presence of China in Iran’s Car Industry” [in Farsi], Donye-e Eghtesad, January 6, 2015.
30. “The Shadow of the Chinese Octopus on the Iranian Car Industry” [in Farsi], Fardanews, May 17,
2015.
31. Mahadi Zahedi, “What Should We Do with Chinese Car Making?” [in Farsi], Jahan-e-Eghtesad Daily,
January 23, 2016.
32. “An Analysis of Chinese Dominance in the Iranian Car Market” [in Farsi], Dana News, May 8, 2016.
33. Shahtau Naseri, “The Lausanne Agreement and Its Impact on the Chinese Spectre in the Car Industry”
[in Farsi], Ireconomy Online, April 5, 2015.
34. Ahmad Farhadi, “Does China Make Us Car Producers?” [in Farsi], Shargh Daily, May 4, 2014.
35. Fariborz Darjezi, “Behind the Xinjiang Scenario” [in Farsi], Jam-e-Jam Daily, November 4, 2009.
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struggle is not separation from China and that the cause of Uyghur separatism
had been purposely exaggerated in the Western media.36
In the most vitriolic attack on the Iranian reformist stance regarding Xinjiang,
an unsigned editorial in Kayhan (Iran’s leading conservative newspaper) argued
that the reformists blindly copied arguments from that Western media: “There is
a political front in Iran for which the essence or the sides of the struggle are mean-
ingless. The goal is to dovetail with the West in any shape or form. Without deep
reﬂection, they blindly follow the interests of the West. Although the majority of
the deaths are of non-Muslims, the reformist media claims that all deaths in Xin-
jiang are of Muslims. Instead of real support for Uyghur Muslims, they ape the
analyses of the Western media.”37 According to the editorial, the reformists thus
had two goals in mind: ﬁrst, to create an artiﬁcial tension between the Ahmadi-
nejad administration and China and, second, to discredit conservatives by attrib-
uting a hypocritical position to them, namely, supporting Muslims in Gaza while
supposedly snubbing Uyghurs in China. For the conservatives, the real danger was
the threat of growing Islamophobia in the West, not Xinjiang. Hence, rather than
severely criticizing China, they outlined several initiatives the Chinese government
could implement in order to improve the conditions of Muslims in Xinjiang.
Some reformists for their part argued that, over the last few decades, theChinese
government has skewed the demography of Xinjiang at the expense of Uyghurs
and in favor of Han Chinese and that it has increased the level of suppression to-
ward theUyghurs in the name of the “war on terror” following 9/11.38 The reform-
ists insisted it was wrong of Iran to make a distinction between Palestinian and
Uyghur suffering. They charged that in its coverage of the Xinjiang conﬂict, the
government news agency IRNA “acted as a part of the Chinese Communist Party
news agency.”39 By comparing the much lengthier media coverage of an Islamo-
phobic incident in Germany with the suppression of the Uyghurs in China, the re-
formists reiterated that Iranian conservatives discriminated betweenMuslim com-
munities around the world out of political expediency.40
IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA ’S “NEW CONFUCIANISM”
In December 2015, the Confucius Institute at the University of Tehran was es-
tablished to promote Chinese-language instruction and culture in Iran. Accord-
36. Ibid.
37. “The Whip of Support for Chinese Muslims Is in the Hands of the US” [in Farsi], Kayhan Daily,
July 15, 2009.
38. Hadi Firouzi, “The War on Terror Is an Excuse for Suppression” [in Farsi], Shargh Daily, Septem-
ber 14, 2015.
39. “Government Passivity Regarding the Killing of Muslims in China” [in Farsi], Mardomsalari News,
July 13, 2016.
40. A. Mohebi, “The Velvet Revolution in Xinjiang” [in Farsi], Mardomsalari, July 12, 2009.
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ing to think tanks and newspapers close to both Iranian reformists and conser-
vatives, the Chinese government was trying to appeal to local public opinion to
improve China’s image abroad.41
For most reformist commentators, however, the war-averse and paciﬁst Con-
fucian image that modern China is appropriating amounts to nothing but a means
of securing China’s own economic growth and expansion of its political inﬂuence.
Beijing is seen to be investing capital to foreground its peaceful intentions not just
in Iran but also in other countries in Central Asia as a means of facilitating the
building of a “New Silk Road” essential for its economic growth.42 They argue that
China’s public diplomacy could be seen as “realpolitik with the taste of Confucian-
ism.”43
Contrary to the reformists, who are typically suspicious of China’s intentions,
the conservatives have been more receptive to the language of “New Confucian-
ism” emanating from Beijing. For instance, by linking coverage of Chinese at-
tempts to establish Confucius Institutes with aid for the construction of mosques
and religious institutions in the Muslim world,44 conservatives cast a favorable
light on China as an Islam-friendly rising global power working for the common
good, unlike the United States.
SaedMohammad Ali Husseini, the Iranian foreignministry spokesman during
Ahmadinejad’s presidency,45 praised Beijing as “one of the most active players in
international public diplomacy.” Nevertheless, Husseini challenged China not
just to reduce the role of diplomacy to promoting Chinese values and portraying
itself as “civilized, cultured and popular” but also to play a more active role along-
side its allies, notably Iran and possibly Russia, for regional and global security.
To fulﬁll this objective, he asserted that China must harness its popularity in
the Gulf Arab states—especially after 9/11 and the declining popularity of the
United States in the Middle East—and that it must put pressure on Saudi Arabia
in particular so that Riyadh cut its direct and indirect support to “terrorist groups.”
Husseini concluded that the “deceptive” Western coalition against the Islamic
State (ISIS), with Saudi backing, should not be trusted. Instead, China must revise
its conservative paciﬁsm and join Iran for “a serious, effective, comprehensive and
honest ﬁght against terrorism.”46
41. For a Western point of view on China’s soft-power enhancement efforts, see David Shambaugh,
“China’s Soft-Power Push,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4 (2015): 99–107.
42. “The Presence of China in Central Asia and the Challenges Ahead” [in Farsi], Fardanews, April 6,
2016.
43. Arash Azizi, “Realpolitik with the Taste of Confucianism” [in Farsi], Shargh Daily, June 27, 2011.
44. “The Inﬂuence of China’s Public Diplomacy Is Growing in the Muslim World” [in Farsi], Fars News
Agency, February 19, 2012.
45. He was a member of the Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy team between September 2006 and July 2008.
46. S. M. A. Husseini, “Beijing, the Most Active Player in International Public Diplomacy” [in Farsi],
Meher News Agency, January 24, 2016.
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While China’s successes in offsetting Western “propaganda” were celebrated
by some Iranian conservatives, it was also suggested that more must be done by
China to become an established cultural power in the coming years. According to
some Iranian conservatives, Beijing will need to make huge investments to attract
wider foreign audiences and reshape global public opinion in the future.47
STRATEGIC RELATIONS
As noted a dozen years ago in JohnGarver’s pioneering study, Chinese and Iranian
elites often proclaim common ground in that both countries are heirs to great civ-
ilizations that never went to war with one another. Both modern states had been
overwhelmed byWestern imperialism in the nineteenth century, and they share a
sense of “humiliation” as a result.48
For China, Iran stands out as a counterweight to excessive American inﬂuence
in theMiddle East and a possible source of leverage in support of China’s expand-
ing interests in the region.49 Nonetheless, China and Iran have to face the reality
that the United States remains the most important country inﬂuencing their well-
being in one way or another, and thus China’s policy vis-à-vis Iran depends on
the state of its relationship with the United States.50 It has to pursue its courtship
of Iran within the framework of Sino-American amity and cooperation.51 The
overall guideline for China’s Iran policy is still very much the notion that China’s
leaders do not want to have to choose between the United States and Iran.52
It should be stressed that China and Iran’s interests vis-à-vis the United States
differ greatly even if they share a common rhetorical facade denouncing US hege-
mony.53 China has been facing a dilemma with regard to its Iran policy; namely,
“Chinese leaders have to painfully balance their impulse toward economic coop-
eration with Iran against other vital interests, including convincing Washington
47. “Public Diplomacy as China’s Means of Inﬂuence on the International Arena” [in Farsi], Al-Waght,
May 7, 2015.
48. John W. Garver, introduction to China and Iran, and also “China and Iran: Expanding Cooperation
under Conditions of US Domination,” in Toward Well-oiled Relations? China’s Presence in the Middle East
following the Arab Spring, ed. Niv Horesh (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 180.
49. Michael D. Swaine, “Beijing’s Tightrope Walk on Iran,” China Leadership Monitor 33 (2010): 2.
50. Lounnas Djallil, “China and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Between Ambiguities and Interests,” European
Journal of East Asian Studies 10 (2011): 227.
51. John W. Garver, “China-Iran Relations: Cautious Friendship within America’s Nemesis,” China
Report 49, no. 1 (2013): 86.
52. Shen Dingli, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Test China’s Wisdom,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2
(2006): 63.
53. Marybeth Davis, James Lecky, Torrey Froscher, David Chen, Abel Kerevel, and Stephen Schlaikjer,
“China-Iran: A Limited Partnership,” report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 49; Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, “China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations,”
RAND Occasional Paper (2012), 21.
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that China is not a peer competitor or a challenger, but a responsible stakeholder
and strategic partner.”54
When dealing with Iran, China has strong incentives to avoid actions that an-
tagonize the West in general and the United States in particular. Thus, notwith-
standing its rhetorical support of Iran’s bid for membership of the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) in the joint agreement reached in January 2016,
China declined to support Iran’s accession to the SCO in June 2016, fearing it
might give the SCO a strong anti-Western ﬂavor.55
In concrete terms, China over the last decade proved instrumental in bringing
Iran’s nuclear program to heel, largely by abiding by Western sanctions against
Iran, even though it had been complicit in providing the Iranians with sensitive
technological know-how earlier in the 1990s. For that reason, despite China’s on-
going arms sales to Iran, it would be a mistake to overstate the degree of strategic
coordination between the two countries.56
The Iranian defense minister and his Chinese counterpart signed an agree-
ment in November 2016 pledging closer military cooperation in a number of ar-
eas including military training and counterterrorism operations. Both sides also
pledged to hold joint military exercises.57 However, this agreement should not be
understood as a treaty, and there are many steps between cooperation in training,
exercises, dialogues, and so on, and forming a comprehensive military alliance.
Even Iran’s conservatives do not seem to contend otherwise.
Chinese sources indicate China’s primary interest in collaboration with Iran
remains economic. China has been Iran’s top trading partner since 2009.58 Given
China’s rising demand for oil and gas, energy trade will continue to play a sig-
niﬁcant role underpinning China-Iran relations for decades to come.59 Economic
integration will be boosted under China’s much touted “One Belt, One Road”
initiative, with a Yiwu-Tehran train route launched in January 2016 symbolically
reviving the route of the ancient Silk Road between China and Iran.60
54. Zhao Hong, “China’s Dilemma on Iran: Between Energy Security and a Responsible Rising Power,”
Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2013): 209–10.
55. Reuters, “China-Led Bloc Keeps Iran at Arm’s Length despite Russian Backing,” June 23, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-sco-idUSKCN0Z9213; Kevjn Lim, “Iran’s Shanghai Dream:
The Perks and Pitfalls of Joining China’s Security Club,” Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2016, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-07-25/irans-shanghai-dream.
56. Yitzhak Shichor, “Iran after the Sanctions: The Marginalisation of China,” Note Observatoire Chine
(2015–16): 1–5.
57. See http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/iran-china-sign-military-cooperation-agreement/.
58. Liu Jun and Wu Wei, “Key Issues in China-Iran Relations,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies 4, no. 1 (2010): 43.
59. Garver, “China and Iran,” 180.
60. See http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/iran-china-and-the-silk-road-train/.
12 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 79
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.105 on March 27, 2018 07:37:38 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
China’s relationship with Iran is arguably its most intimate and most prob-
lematic bilateral partnership in the Middle East.61 It remains a marriage of con-
venience glued by pragmatic interests.62 Economic interests cannot automatically
translate into good feelings. In fact, surveys show that a majority of the Chinese
public have an unfavorable view of Iran.63 China-Iran relations have so far pre-
dominantly been driven by the governments of these two countries, and the weak
sociocultural foundation of their relations may prevent China and Iran from fos-
tering a truly trustworthy partnership.
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ’S PERCEPTION OF IRAN
This section systematically analyzes the Chinese government’s perception of Iran
based on all the relevant news reports published in Chinese in People’s Daily (Ren-
min ribao人民日报) since early 2012. People’s Daily has served as the ofﬁcial voice
of the Chinese government and is thus the best platform fromwhich to elicit the Chi-
nese government’s perceptions of Iran. After initial screening, we found 60 lengthy
substantive articles published between January 2012 and July 2016 that contained
editorial and strategic insights beyond mere day-to-day narration of current af-
fairs.
From reading these 60 reports it became clear that Iran’s nuclear program has
been the Chinese government’s foremost concern. On the one hand, China has
continued to stress its sympathy for Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for ci-
vilian purposes.64 This is meaningful because China opposes the development of
even civilian nuclear technology when it comes to its pariah neighbor-cum-ally,
North Korea.65 Yet, in line with the United States, the Chinese government op-
poses Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.
Unlike the United States, China has always been opposed to unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions and any threat of military force against Iran and instead insists
that dialogue and negotiation are the only viable way to resolve the Iran nuclear
issue. People’s Daily commentators stressed that Iran’s economy paid a heavy
61. Jon B. Alterman, “China’s Balancing Act in the Gulf,” Gulf Analysis Paper (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 4.
62. Nicolo Nourafchan argues that China has pursued a grand strategy of opportunistic pragmatism to
manage its relations with both Iran and the United States. See Nicolo Nourafchan, “Constructive Partner or
Menacing Threat? Analyzing China’s Role in the Iran Nuclear Program,” Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010): 28–50.
63. According to surveys conducted by Pew Research Center, a majority of Chinese citizens (58 percent in
2013 and 55 percent in 2014) have an unfavorable view of Iran. See Pew Research Center, “Global Views of
Iran Overwhelmingly Negative,” June 11, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/ﬁles/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes
-Project-Iran-Report-FINAL-June-11-2013.pdf, 3, and “Iran’s Global Image Largely Negative,” June 18,
2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/18/irans-global-image-largely-negative/.
64. See, e.g., Du Shangze and Pei Guangjiang, “Xi Jinping tong Yilang zongtong juxing huitan” [Xi Jinping
held talk with the Iranian president], Renmin Ribao, May 23, 2014.
65. Alterman and Garver, The Vital Triangle, 47.
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price for its nuclear program due to tough US-led economic sanctions, as evi-
denced by high unemployment and rising prices and inﬂation.66 China often de-
clared its willingness to play a constructive role in helping resolve the Iran nuclear
issue.67
By and large, the Chinese government has maintained a very positive view as
regards its economic relations with Iran. People’s Daily semantic frequency sug-
gests “economic” (经济) rather than military considerations can be deemed the
most important driver for China-Iran relations. It is noteworthy that the Chinese
government believes that China and Iran’s economies are highly complementary
in their comparative advantages.68
“Cooperation” (合作) and “friendship” (友好) are often invoked to describe
China-Iran relations. Beijing is keen to highlight the longevity of the relationship,
pointing out that since establishing diplomatic relations in 1971 China and Iran
have continued to deepen and broaden their cooperation in almost every ﬁeld and
that their friendship has endured in good times and bad.69 Yet equally important,
none of the People’s Daily reports signals the relations might yield an important
military dimension. On the contrary, they seem in effect to quash Iran’s conser-
vatives’ hopes that such a qualitative leap in the type of relations can come about
under current circumstances.
CHINESE SCHOLARS ’ PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN
We also undertook a detailed content analysis of articles published in core Chinese
academic journals between 2012 and 2016 and Chinese books concerning China-
Iran relations. The compilation method involved highly-related article matches
based on the China Knowledge Resource IntegratedDatabase search functionality.
In total, some 204 articles dedicated to the subject were published in core Chi-
nese journals between 2012 and 2017. After deleting lateral material, we identiﬁed
38 highly relevant lengthier articles and eight scholarly books published between
2012 and 2016. From these we distil the main thrust of the perceptions of Iran on
the assumption that Chinese scholars can expect more freedom of expression than
in the People’s Daily or the state-controlled mass media.
66. See, e.g., Wang Rujun, “Hefengbao wei chuiluan Yilangren pingjing shenghuo” [The nuclear storm
did not disturb Iranian people’s peaceful life], Renmin Ribao, February 22, 2012.
67. See, e.g., Mou Zongcong , Zhang Yang, Wu lejun, Huang Peizhao, Shi Xiaohui, Peng Min, and
Zheng Qi, “Gefang weirao Yilang hewenti shangyan chuansuo waijiao” [All involved countries conducted
shuttle diplomacy regarding Iran nuclear issue], Renmin Ribao, January 20, 2012.
68. “Gongchuang ZhongYi guanxi meihao mingtian” [Working together to create a beautiful tomorrow
for China-Iran relations], Renmin Ribao, January 22, 2016.
69. See, e.g., Li Weihong, “Wu Bangguo kaishi dui Yilang jinxing zhengshi youhao fangwen” [Wu
Bangguo will pay a friendly visit to Iran], Renmin Ribao, September 10, 2012; Tan Jingjing, “Zhang Gaoli
huijian Yilang jingji shiwu yu caizhengbu buzhang” [Zhang Gaoli met with Iranian economic affairs and
ﬁnance minister], Renmin Ribao, April 23, 2014.
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In line with the Chinese government’s perception of Iran, Chinese scholars
largely accept that Iran occupies a crucial geostrategic location in the Middle East
greatly impacting China’s energy security; Iran straddles the Caspian Sea and the
Persian Gulf, areas that contain the world’s two richest oil and gas reserves, with
the Strait of Hormuz within range of its control.70 Second, Iran and China’s west-
ern frontiers are connected across the Zagros and Hindu Kush mountain ranges
and theHimalayas. Given such a geostrategic location, Iran can be seen as a bridge-
head safeguarding the security of China’s western frontier, China’s ﬁrst “ﬁrewall”
against potential Western expansion.71
Third, in light of Iran’s position as the largest Shi’a Muslim country in the
world, China regards it as strategically important. Iran is the unquestioned leader
of the Shi’a bloc which competes for inﬂuence with the Sunni bloc led by Saudi
Arabia. Iran has expanded and solidiﬁed its geopolitical interests across the Mid-
dle East in recent years due to US military blunders in the region. Iran’s religious
geostrategy is deemed defensive rather than offensive in nature and is a rational
response to external pressure.72
Furthermore, Iran and Turkey are considered as the “dual core” of the geopol-
itics of theMiddle East.73 On the one hand, Iran is an important player not only in
dealing with the divisive Iraqi and Syrian issues but also in helping resolve Af-
ghanistan’s security issues and the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict. On the other hand,
Iran’s long-standing confrontationwith theUnited States is seen byChinese schol-
ars as a thorny factor, presenting both opportunities and challenges for China’s ex-
panding interests in the Middle East. Notably, they concede that the US-Iran con-
frontation has slowed down the United States’ pivot to the Asia Paciﬁc, thereby
greatly alleviating China’s strategic pressure from the United States.74 And this ad-
mission by Chinese scholars arguably dovetails with Iranian reformists’ concerns
about opportunism in China’s foreign policy and insincerity in its pro-Iran “civ-
ilizational” rhetoric.
70. See, e.g., Wen-Sheng Chen, “China’s Oil Strategy: “Going Out” to Iran,” Asian Politics & Policy 2,
no. 1 (2010): 42.
71. See, e.g., Zhang Wenmu, “Tiantang hen yuan, Zhongguo que hen jin: Zhongguo yu zhoubian Guojia
he diqu de Diyuan zhengzhi hudong Guilu he tedian” [Paradise is far away, but China is nearby: A study
on geopolitics between China and its neighboring countries and regions and the law of their interaction],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [Journal of world economics and politics] 1 (2013): 33–34.
72. See, e.g., Jin Liangxiang, “Houxieyi [后协议] shidai Yilang de zhanlue diwei he Zhongyi guanxi”
[Iran’s strategic position in the postagreement era and China-Iran relations], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan
[Forum of world economics and politics] 1 (2016): 38–39.
73. Chen Junhua and Ma Junyi, “Zhongdong diyuan zhengzhi xingeju yu Yilang weiji” [New geopolitical
situation in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear crisis], Shijie dili yanjiu [World regional studies] 22,
no. 1 (2013): 23–24; Shen Changcheng, Chen Junhua, Gao Lei, and Yu Ling, “Zhongdong diyuan zhengzhi
huanjing dui Yilang jueqi de yingxiang qianxi” [Analysis of Mideast geopolitical environment’s inﬂuence on
Iran’s rise], Shijie dili yanjiu [World regional studies], 24, no. 2 (2015): 33–34.
74. See, e.g., Hua Liming, “Yilang hewenti yu Zhongguo zhongdong waijiao” [The Iran nuclear issue and
China’s Middle East diplomacy], Alabo shijie yanjiu [Arab world studies], 6 (2014): 12–15.
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Chinese scholars broadly reafﬁrm the ofﬁcial view that economic cooperation
remains the overriding rationale for improved bilateral relations, and they dis-
count the potential for closer military ties. Interestingly, in a mirror image of Ira-
nian reformist views, a number of these Chinese scholars nevertheless blame
China’s growing reliance on Iranian oil and gas as creating lopsided trade in re-
cent years. They note that China’s economic dependence on Iran has risen, while
Iran’s economic dependence on China has decreased.75
Several scholars note Iran’s chances of becoming an economic powerhouse in
the Middle East improved after the comprehensive nuclear agreement was reached
in Vienna in 2015.76 The US-led economic sanctions seriously damaged Iran’s econ-
omy, thereby softening Iran’s stance in the nuclear talks, and the success of the ne-
gotiations will bring new opportunities to deepen China-Iran economic coopera-
tion, since American pressure on both China and Iran has lessened.77 Although
Iran has a strategic location for infrastructural connections between Europe, Cen-
tral Asia, and the Middle East, Chinese scholars warn their government that China
should not take Iran’s support of the One Belt, One Road initiative for granted.
Iran has always cherished its own way of development and hence has taken a cau-
tious stance on cooperating with China on this initiative.78 China should try to ﬁnd
common ground to promote cooperation with Iran compatible with Iran’s own
economic and political situation.79
Akin to People’s Daily coverage, most of the academic articles focus on the nu-
clear issue seeing it as a typical political problem relating to the troubled relations
between the United States and Iran. In Chinese eyes, Iran is an enemy created by
the United States.80 Some contend Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weap-
75. Yang Xingli, Ji Kaiyun, Chen Junhua, and Yang Shanshan, Xiandai Zhongguo yu Yilang guanxi
[Modern relations between China and Iran] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2012), 154–61; Fan Hongda, Yilang
yu Meiguo: Cong pengyou dao diren [Iran and the United States: From friend to enemy] (Beijing: Xinhua
Chubanshe, 2012), 205–6.
76. Jin Liangxiang, “Houxieyi [后协议] shidai,” 39–41.
77. Tian Wenlin, “ZhongYi guanxi: Hexieyi qianshu dailai xinjiyu” [China-Iran relations: Conclusion of the
nuclear agreement brings new opportunities], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary international relations] 12
(2015): 4; Cai Penghong, “Meiguo zhicai Yilang jiqi dui Zhongguo de yingxiang” [The US’s sanction on Iran
and its inﬂuence on China], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary international relations] 4 (2012): 19–20.
78. Lu Jin, “Lishi yu xianshi shiquexia de ZhongYi hezuo: Jiyu Yilangren dui yidai yilu renzhi de jiedu”
[China-Iran cooperation in history and modern times: An explanation based on Iranian views of the “Belt
and Road” initiative], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa] 6 (2015): 60.
79. Fan Hongda, “Zhongguo zai Yilang tuijin ‘Yidai Yilu’ zhanlue changyi de zhengzhi huanjing yu
yinying” [China’s “Belt and Road” initiative in Iran: Political environment and coping style], Xiya Feizhou
[West Asia and Africa] 2 (2016): 63.
80. See, e.g., He Fan, “Guoke Zhongde Yilang” [Iran in a nutshell], Guoji jingji pinglun [International
economic review] 5 (2012): 64; Chen Jinwen and Niu Xinchun, “MeiYi huanhe qiandong Zhongdong
zhanlue geju” [The US-Iran rapprochement impacts the Middle Eastern strategic conﬁguration], Xiandai
guoji guanxi [Contemporary international relations] 12 (2013): 26.
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ons for the sake of its survival in the face of American hostility.81 The United
States is also accused of applying double standards: before 1979, the United States
was the earliest supporter of Iran’s development of a civilian nuclear capability. In
Chinese scholars’ view, the United States’ double standard is best demonstrated
by its tacit acceptance of Israel’s nuclear weapons but strong opposition to Iran’s
nuclear program.82 However, a number of Chinese scholars warn that Iran aims to
challenge the current US-dominated order and then expand its inﬂuence in the
Middle East by attempting to develop nuclear weapons, which has aroused deep
apprehensions of the United States and its long-standing allies, such as Israel and
Saudi Arabia.83
The level of concern raised in Chinese scholarly sources about this exceeds
what is found in People’s Daily. The vitriol Iranian conservatives habitually pour
on Israel’s right to exist is subtly frowned on here.84 In that sense, too, one can eas-
ily identify wishful thinking in Iranian conservatives’ hopes for a strategic break-
through in relations with China.
CHINESE SCHOLARS ON IRAN ’S DOMESTIC
POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE
In the eyes of Chinese scholars, Iran has become more and more secular and
pragmatic, despite continuing pressure from conservative Islamists in the regime
and the imposition of Islamic laws and regulations on society. It is argued that
Iranian society is not an oppressed and closed society as is its popular image in
the Western media. Instead, it is cast as dynamic, young, secular, and full of vital-
ity.85 In addition, it is argued that there are extensive debates over Iran’s domestic
and foreign policies. Most Iranian people, in particular students, do not embrace
anti-Americanism, and a growing force within the government is inclined to im-
prove Iran’s relations with the United States.86 The Islamic theocracy has sought
to maintain its political legitimacy by relyingmore on economic performance and
81. See, e.g., Yue Hanjing, Aobama zhengfu dui Yilang de jiechu zhengce yanjiu [Research on the Obama
administration’s “engagement policy” toward Iran] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2014), 169.
82. See, e.g., Guo Xiangang, “Zhongdong wuhehua: Pojie Yihe wenti de chulu” [The Middle East
denuclearization: Break the deadlock of the Iran nuclear issue], Guoji wenti yanjiu [China international
studies] 3 (2013): 130; Fan Hongda, Yilang yu Meiguo, 193.
83. See, e.g., Liu Qiang, Tian Wenlin, Sun Degang, and Huang Rihan, “Yilang heweiji de shizhi yu
qianjing” [The essence and outlook of the Iranian nuclear crisis], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of
world economics and politics] 2 (2012): 165–66; Wu Cheng, Yilang hewenti yu shijie geju zhuanxing [The
Iranian nuclear issue and the world pattern transformation] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2014), 50.
84. See, e.g., Xiao Xian, “Yiluyidai shijiaoxia de Zhongguo yu Yiselie guanxi” [Sino-Israeli relations
through the OBOR prism], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa] 2 (2016): 91–108.
85. See, e.g., Wang Wen, “Yilang shidi kaochahou de zongjie” [A summary after conducting the ﬁeldwork
in Iran], Hongqi wengao [Red-ﬂag essays] (2012): 34.
86. Fan Hongda, “Zhongguo zai Yilang,” 61.
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improvement of people’s livelihood and less on a revolutionary path emphasizing
Islamic ideology and anti-Americanism.87 In their writings on this, Chinese schol-
ars seem to favor reducedUS-Iran tensions, which will allowChina to deepen eco-
nomic relations with Iran without provoking Washington’s ire. There is no basis
in the scholarly literature from which to infer that stronger military bonds be-
tween China and Iran might be imminent or desirable.
In spite of incessant competition between the different political factions in
Iran, there has been a consensus among Chinese scholars that the theocratic re-
gime is more durable than it might appear in the West. Chinese sources allege
that prejudice and misunderstanding in the West paint Iran’s Islamic theocracy
as backward, but in fact, the supreme leader cannot wield power unconditionally
and has only limited control over Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. Chinese
scholars cast Iran’s theocratic regime as historically grounded in—and compat-
ible with—Iran’s social and political conditions.88
Nevertheless, Chinese scholars concede that the people of China and Iran still
have a limited understanding of each other’s society and culture. Popular animos-
ity can surface from time to time: during the 2009 unrest known as Iran’s failed
“green revolution,” for example, some demonstrators reportedly chanted “death
to China.”89 More recently, many ordinary people in Iran have embraced a more
negative perception of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative than have Iranian
ofﬁcials and scholars.90
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom in the West is that China-Iran relations are in effect con-
strained by Beijing’s reluctance to risk instability in its relations withWashington.
The assumption is that Beijing can be called to order by Washington whenever
particular facets of its economic ties with Tehran carry a worrisome geostrategic
potential. Iran and China’s bilateral relations are far from ironclad, not least be-
cause of Chinese worries that large-scale investments in Iran might alienate other
countries, as well as Iranian concerns about overreliance on the Chinese market.91
87. Xiong Lili and Yan Zhanyu, “Yilang zhengzhi hefaxing zhuanxing yu MeiYi guanxi zhong Yiselie
yinsu zaijiedu” [Iran’s political legitimacy transition and reinterpretation of the Israel factor in US-Iran
relations], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of world economics and politics] 5 (2015): 4–5.
88. Jin Liangxiang, “Yilang de lingxiu zhiguo moshi chuyi” [An analysis of Iran’s model of the supreme
leader’s rule], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa] 4 (2015): 41–42; Wu Cheng, Yilang hewenti, 86–87;
Wang Zhenrong, “Yilang Yisilan Gongheguo zhengzhi tizhi yanjiu” [The political system of the Islamic
Republic of Iran], Alabo shijie yanjiu [Arab world studies] 2 (2014): 64.
89. Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2016), 51.
90. Lu Jin, “Lishi yu Xianshi,” 68.
91. Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney, “Getting China to Sanction Iran: The Chinese-Iranian Oil
Connection,” Foreign Affairs, no. 2 (2011): 15–21.
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We deem this assessment as largely correct but have delved deeper than in previ-
ous studies into Iranian domestic politics as an important factor in shaping bilat-
eral relations.
Drawing on various Farsi-language sources, we have shown that the divide be-
tween reformists and conservatives in Iran translates into starkly bifurcating at-
titudes toward China. Several recurrent themes in this Iranian strategic discourse
on China emerged. It is clear that reformists take China’s pronouncements about
civilizational afﬁnity between the two countries with a grain of salt, and a few have
gone as far as using ethnic tensions in Xinjiang to undermine China’s Islam-
friendly image, in deﬁance of Tehran’s ofﬁcial stance. The upshot in reformist eyes
is that China cannot be trusted as reliable ally and that preference should be given
to Europe to break Tehran’s diplomatic and economic isolation.While the conser-
vatives largely aspire to deepen economic cooperation with China, reformists por-
tray that cooperation as Chinese exploitation.
We also examined a large body of Chinese sources that tested the Iranian con-
servatives’ optimistic assumptions about China’s attitude. We found that Chinese
sources do not lend support to the Iranian conservatives’ hopes of expanding bi-
lateral relations substantively beyond economics. Rather, concern is implicitly raised
about Iran’s confrontational approach to theUnited States (as well as to Saudi Ara-
bia and Israel) and about Iran’s desire for Middle Eastern supremacy on the back
of nuclear capability. While Beijing has had to prioritize relations with Iran in
order to bring about a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis, it has been wary
of deeper engagement due to China’s need to maintain productive relations with
the United States and its allies, China’s assessment of the complexities of Iran’s
society and political system, and the ﬁerce streak of independence prevalent among
Iran’s elite and populace.
Interestingly, both Iranian and Chinese sources suggest that the people-to-
people dimension of the bilateral relations remains shallow. But Iranian conserva-
tives and reformists alike laud China’s economic achievements at home even if
they are at variance about whether Chinese expertise can beneﬁt Iran’s manufac-
turing industry.
Our analysis of Chinese and Iranian views suggests that the two countries are
not on the brink of upgrading their relationship into a military alliance. This is be-
cause China does not seem willing at this stage to risk its relations with the United
States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel (in that order) and also because China’s interest
in Iran remains largely economic. In a broader sense, the economics of China’s
One Belt, One Road trump strategic considerationswhen it comes to Iran.92 Equally,
we reach this conclusion because Rouhani’s Iran is intimating a wish for a thaw
92. Flynt Leverett and Wu Bingbing, “The New Silk Road and China’s Evolving Grand Strategy,” China
Journal, no. 77 (January 2017): 129–30.
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of its relations with the West. The prevalent view of China during Ahmadinejad’s
presidency was of a natural strategic ally of the Islamic Republic, that is, as pro-
Islamic, stability-minded, and anti-imperialistic. Under Rouhani, this view has been
offset by more skeptical assessment.
As Iran accesses the West, it should need other powers less. Thus, even when
they declare their admiration for China’s economic developmentmodel and advo-
cate themaintenance of friendly relations, Iranian reformists see Beijing at heart as
an opportunistic actor in the international systemwhose ultimate goal is economic
hegemony. Therefore, rather than a ground-breaking alliance-in-waiting, the agree-
ment of November 2016—in which the Iranian defense minister and his Chinese
counterpart pledged to hold joint military exercises in the near future—should
be merely read as a tentative signal to the international community. The purpose
thereof is to warn against renunciation by the West of the nuclear agreement.
Typically, conservative and reformist journalists spar over whether China is a
boon to the Iranian economy or the mainspring of low-quality products that crip-
ple local producers. In reality, these countering narratives seem, for the most part,
to be merely a projection of a much more signiﬁcant debate over attitudes to the
West. Although China could play a leading role in the rehabilitation of the Iranian
economy, the reformists, unlike the conservatives, aremore interested in an Iranian-
Western economic relationship. Perhaps for that reason, the fact that China is gov-
erned by an atheist, nominally Communist party is not an ideological argument
that the conservative Islamic faction in Iranian politics is interested in foreground-
ing. While China-Iran bilateral relations have improved rather dramatically since
the 1990s, and Iran has grown more dependent on the Chinese economy through
exports of hydrocarbons and imports of goods and services, our foregoing analysis
suggests that large segments of the Iranian elite and population still crave closer
ties with theWest, which they see the nuclear deal as facilitating. So, despite an ap-
petite to widen areas of cooperation and partnership with China, relations not only
remain transactional but arguably remain a function of both parties’ reactive pre-
occupation with the United States and its policies.
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